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EDWARD GORDON*

Trends
The Blocking of Iranian Assets
A ruling in mid-July of 1980 by United States District Court Judge George
L. Hart, Jr., granting plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction and
partial summary judgment on the issue of liability in American International
Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran' was important financial news. But
Judge Hart's ruling is no less significant for its doctrinal implications. He
concluded, inter alia, that Iran's nationalization of plaintiff insurance companies' equity interests in Iranian insurance companies in 1979 without a
provision for prompt, adequate and effective compensation at or prior to the
time of taking, had violated both conventional (i.e., treaty) and customary
international law, that plaintiffs had standing to assert rights for violations
of such law, and that neither the act of state doctrine nor sovereign immunity
precludes the court from exercising personal jurisdiction over Iran.2 Such
broad holdings would be noteworthy in.even the most isolated litigation. But
the American International case is not isolated; in fact, in context, and
notwithstanding the importance of the decision to the litigants, it is just one
relatively small part of a vast network of litigation involving the legal ramifications of the political actions in Iran and President Carter's executive order
of November 1979, freezing Iranian assets within United States jurisdiction. 3

*Professor of Law, Albany Law School, Union University. Research assistance for this installment of Trends was provided by V. Russell Patience, J.D., Albany Law School, 1980.
'No. 79-3298 (D.D.C., July 10, 1980) [hereinafter cited as American International case].
Plaintiffs, three groups of American insurance companies which collectively represented all the
American insurance operations in Iran in 1979, had filed suit against Iran on December 7, 1979,
for $35 million in damages arising out of the expropriation of their equity interests in Iranian
insurance companies which had been nationalized the preceding June. See N.Y. Times, July II,
1980, at D9; and N.Y. Times, July 12, 1980, at 23.
'American International case, supra note 1, slip. op. at 3-8.
'Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979).
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The amount involved and the scope of this litigation are vast indeed, and
the issues themselves are so interrelated, that judicial conclusions like Judge
Hart's, even if ultimately reversed, are certain to cause reverberations in
hundreds of pending cases. Moreover, the freeze itself has such profound
policy implications for the integrity and prosperity of international financial
arrangements that neither is apt to be secure until some measure of stability is
restored to the legal presumptions upon which these arrangements rest. For
these reasons the freeze of Iranian assets and ongoing litigation bearing upon
it are the focus of this issue's installment of Trends.
I. The Freeze Order
The President imposed the freeze on Iranian assets on November 14, 1979."
Ten days earlier, the arrival of the deposed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi in
the United States for medical treatment at a New York hospital triggered
violent demonstrations in Teheran, the most conspicuous of which involved
several hundred demonstrators, calling themselves Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy, overrunning the United States Embassy compound, seizing embassy personnel as hostages and appropriating embassy
property and archives. 5 The International Court of Justice subsequently
found that the Iranian government-which, as the government of the state to
which the mission was accredited, was under obligation to take appropriate
steps to protect the United States Embassy-did nothing to prevent the attack, stop it before it reached its completion or oblige the militants to
withdraw from the premises and release the hostages.' For the next few days,
relations between the United States and Iran, already strained in light of the
relentless anti-American vituperation emanating from leaders of the revolution that had overthrown the Shah and rejected the Iranian monarchy itself,
all but snapped as a result of the attack on the embassy and the seizure and
continued captivity of the United States diplomatic personnel. On November
14, in the midst of this crisis, and as political pressure mounted on President
Carter to take decisive action to force Iran to release the hostages, Iran announced it intended to withdraw its funds from American banks and their
overseas branches and transfer them to friendlier countries., News of the
announcement reached Washington before dawn on the 14th' and led

AVd.
'See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, [1980] I.C.J., 56, cited in
Communique No. 80/5, 24 May 1980, at 3.
I.C.J.
6
1d.
'See N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, at 1; and R. Ball, The Unseemly Squabble Over Iran 's Assets,
FORTUNE, Jan. 28, 1980, at 61. Mr. Bani-Sadr's assertion was later contradicted by Ali Reza
Nobari, Governor of Bank Markazi, Iran's central bank. Id. at 62. In December the Iranian
government reiterated that position in advertisements which appeared in major newspapers in
the United States and Europe. See Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1979, at 2, 10.
Id.
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Treasury Secretary G. William Miller to awaken the President and to recommend that he sign an executive order freezing Iranian assets. 9 The resulting
order,'owhich was subsequently implemented by Treasury Department regulations," applied to property and interests in property of the government of

Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities, and the Central Bank of
Iran "which are in or come within the possession or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." Initial estimates of the amount
involved ranged from Secretary Miller's estimate of around $6 billion
(U.S.)' 2 to that of Iran's then-Minister of Economics and Finance, Abol
Hassan Bani-Sadr, of about $12 billion.' 3
The lower figure appears to have been an estimate of the bank deposits
affected by the freeze,"' an amount which includes Iranian deposits held in
foreign branches of U.S. banks.' The U.S. government has taken the position that the freeze applies to deposits in such branches. That position is
challenged in litigation initiated by Iran and non-bank claimants throughout
6
Europe. '
On November 5 the government of Iran had instructed Chase Manhattan
Bank, as agent for a syndicate of American and foreign banks which had
made a $500 million loan to the old Imperial Government of Iran, to draw on
Iranian assets in London and pay an interest installment of some $4 million,
effective November 14, the due date. On that date, following the President's
action, Chase informed Iran that it could not legally carry out Iran's instructions in light of the freeze order. Moreover, the bank demanded immediate
payment of the installment by Iran and when Iran did not comply, Chase
debited Iran's frozen accounts in overseas branches for the full amount of the
loan, an action known as setoff or offset, in this instance triggered by the loan
syndicate's determination that Iran's failure to pay the interest installment
constituted an act of default. ' Other banks in the syndicate moved to offset
'N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, at 1. According to news reports, at about 4:45 A.M., Washington

time, a Treasury Department watch officer read a French wire service transmission stating that

Iran was planning to withdraw its assets from American banks. After determining that no
withdrawals had yet been made and after asking for support from central banks in Europe and
Japan, Secretary Miller woke President Carter at 5:45 A.M., recommending that he sign the
executive order freezing Iranian assets, the order having been prepared several days before. The
President signed it at about 8:00 A.M. See Escalating the Iranian Drama, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 26,
1979, at 31.
'"Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979).
"See note 78, infra.
"N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, at 1.
'31d.
"See Ball, supra note 7, at 61.
"See The Banks Squabble Over Iran's Assets, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 3, 1979, at 110.
"See, e.g., Iran Mounts an Attack to Retrieve Its Assets, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 4, 1980, at 25; N.Y.
Times, Dec. 1, 1979, at 27, 29.
"Chase reportedly polled the eleven members of the loan syndicate and found the seven
American banks in favor of declaring Iran to be in default and the four foreign banks against.
See Ball, supra note 7, at 61. It appears, however, that the four negative votes would have been
affirmative ifthose banks had known of the applicability of the President's freeze order to Iran's
dollar deposits with foreign branches of American banks. See Why Did Chase Move So Fast?
EUROMONEY, January 1980 (cover story).
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Iranian deposits on account in their branches and they and soon other creditors and potential creditors rushed to attach virtually every Iranian government asset available for attachment in the United States and Europe. I"Litigation then ensued, some of it initiated by Iran itself, challenging the legality of
the offsets, the attachments and even the applicability of the President's
freeze order to Iran's deposits in foreign branches of American. banks. Hundreds of cases are pending.' 9
In considering some of the issues these cases raise, it is convenient to begin
with an historical review of the legal framework within which the President
acted in freezing Iran's assets, since it was the President's freeze which triggered the events with which the litigation, in large measure, is concerned.
II. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act

In blocking Iranian assets, the President acted pursuant to authority
granted to him under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA).21 The IEEPA was enacted as part of a group of reforms aimed at
section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act.' Section 5(b), the origin of
which dates back to the first world war, had been the basis of authority for
emergency executive actions ranging from the wartime freeze of Axis assets
to the imposition of import surcharges during the 1971 balance of payments
crisis.22 A major flaw in the regime it created was that, whereas its original
purpose had been to further a war effort, it contained no criteria limiting the
emergency a President could declare pursuant to it to periods of war. In fact,
it contained no criteria whatever for finding that a national emergency existed, despite the extraordinary powers it granted the President once such a
national emergency was declared by him.
Without dwelling on the point, one is nonetheless obliged to recall that
government-imposed general restraints on the use or alienability of specific,
nonpublic property represent an abnormal regime under the United States
Constitution. After attempts by several American states to confiscate Britishowned private property and debts during the Revolutionary War, the two
nations, in article 10 of the Jay Treaty, had paved the way for a long series of
treaties made by the United States with other countries by providing that

"Id. See also N.Y. Times,
mated $2.6 billion in Iranian
"See sources cited in note
"50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.
'50 U.S.C. § 95a (current

Nov. 29, 1979, at DI. At the time, American banks had an estigovernment loans on their books. See Ball, supra note 7, at 60.
16, supra.
(1977).
version at 50 U.S.C. app. § I et seq. (1970)).

"HousE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT REFORM LEG-

ISLATION, H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No.
4591. See generally Note, PresidentialEmergency Powers Related to International Economic
Transactions:CongressionalRecognition of CustomaryAuthority, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
515 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note].
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Neither the debts due from individuals of one nation to individuals of the other, nor
shares, nor monies, which they have in the public funds, or in the public or private
banks, shall ever in any event of war or national differences be sequestrated or
confiscated, it being unjust and impolitic that debts and engagements contracted
and made by individuals, having confidence in each other and in their respective
Governments, should ever be destroyed or impaired by national authority on account of national differences and discontents.23
In defense of this provision, Alexander Hamilton wrote two of his Camillus
Letters, arguing, in part, as follows:
The right of holding or having property in a country always implies a duty on the
part of its government to protect that property, and to secure to the owner the full
enjoyment of it. Whenever, therefore, a government grants permission to foreigners to acquire property within its territories, or to bring and deposit it there, it
tacitly promises protection and security.
There is no parity between the case of the persons and goods of enemies found in
our country and that of the persons and goods of enemies found elsewhere." In the
former there is a reliance upon our hospitability and justice; there is an express or
implied safe conduct; the individuals and their property are in the custody of our
faith; they have no power to resist our will; they can lawfully make no defense
against our violence; they are deemed to owe a temporary allegiance; and for endeavoring resistance would be punished as criminals, a character inconsistent with
that of an enemy. To make them a prey is, therefore, to infringe every rule of
generosity and equity; it is to add cowardice to treachery....
Moreover, the property of the foreigners within our country may be regarded as
having paid a valuable consideration for its protection and exemption from forfeiture; that which is brought in commonly enriches the revenue by a duty of entry. All
that is within our territory, whether acquired there or brought there, is liable to
contributions to the treasury, in common with other similar property. Does there
not result an obligation to protect that which contributes to the expense of its
protection? Will justice sanction, upon the breaking out of a war, the confiscation
of a property which, during peace, serves to augment the resources and nourish the
prosperity of a state?
The property of a foreigner placed in another country, by permission of its laws,
may justly be regarded as a deposit, of which the society is the trustee. How can it be
reconciled with the idea of a trust, to take the property from its owner, when he has
personally given no cause for its deprivation."
In his Camillus Letter XVIII, Hamilton added:
No powers of language at my command can express the abhorrence I feel at the idea
of violating the property of individuals, which, in an authorized intercourse in time
of peace has been confided to the faith of our government and laws, on account of
controversy between nation and nation. In my view, every moral and every political
sense unite to consign it to execration."

"Quoted by Edwin Borchard in his Introduction to J. GATHINGS,

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

vii (1940) [hereinafter cited as GATHINGS].
reference is to booty or prize. See generally 10 WHITEMAN, DIoEST OF INTERNATIONAL

AMERICAN TREATMENT OF ALIEN ENEMY PROPERTY
1'The

763.
"Quoted by Professor

LAW

"Id. at viii.

Borchard in GATHINOS, supra note 23, at vii-viii.
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Professor Edwin Borchard, whose most enduring work in the international
law field pertained to the diplomatic protection of citizens and their claims,
once observed that" [a]t every international conference of the 19th century in
which the subject was discussed, the United States exerted its influence in
behalf of the sanctity of private property ... ."" By World War I, however,
most nations had adopted policies favoring control of enemy private property within their borders. 28 Sequestration, as the process was called, consisted
of states seizing the property of enemy nationals within their borders, declaring at the time of seizure it was not their intention to confiscate the property, but to use and to conserve it until the end of the war and to return it or its
value to the former owners.29 There had been measures adopted by belligerent states prior to this practice which were called sequestration acts, but they
were in fact acts of confiscation and not of sequestration; that is, there was no
declared intention to return the property at the time it was taken. 3"
At the outbreak of war in 1914 a great deal of private property belonging to
alien nationals was located within the territory of the belligerent states. Much
of it took the form of investments in business firms furnishing materials
necessary to the war effort. The war being economic as well as purely military, fear existed that enemy aliens might use their private property to hamper the state in its conduct of the war, by sabotage, by failure to deliver war
materials on time or by using the income from the property to build up credit
in international trade which would be averse to the state where the property
was located. This was especially true when the enemy property was composed
of key industries furnishing war materials and supplies from which a substantial profit would be derived. Moreover, the economic interdependence of the
European states was such that enemy companies had become multinational
in scope and organization, rather than national, with international boards of
directors and international holding companies. Then, too, the economic
character of the war manifested itself in national strategies designed to cripple the enemy economically to such an extent that it would not be a competitor in world trade markets.'

27d.

28

GATHINGS,

29

supra note 23, at 46.

d.

"Ild. Professor James A. Gathings observed that
The acts of England and France during the wars from 1793 to 1814 were measures of sequestration. Private enemy property was seized by these states, but they did not declare it to be their
intention to retain the property but to hold it for the former owners at the end of the war. The
measures were supposedly adopted to protect this private property for the duration of the war,
but it was held by the states and used for bargaining purposes after the war on a quidpro quo
basis. The so-called sequestration measures of the American States during the Revolutionary
War and the laws of the Southern Confederacy during the American Civil War were for all
practical purposes confiscation measures.
GATHINGS, supra note 23 at 46.
'Id. at 47.
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In the United States, as elsewhere, these factors engendered a xenophobic
spell leading to calls for a retributive (as well as profitable) war on enemy
property. Thus, when the United States, upon entering the war and following
the lead of European states, appointed an Alien Property Custodian to hold
sequestered alien property, the functions of his office soon changed from
that of trustee to that of "spoliator". John Bassett Moore, who held the post,
described its metamorphosis this way:
In the original statute the function of alien property custodian was defined as that
of a trustee. Subsequently, however, there came a special revelation, marvelously
brilliant but perhaps not divinely inspired, of the staggering discovery that the
foreign traders and manufacturers whose property had been taken over had made
their investments in the United States not from ordinary motives of profit but in
pursuance of a hostile design, so stealthily pursued that it had never before been
detected or even suspected, but so deadly in its effects that the American traders and
manufacturers were eventually to be engulfed in their own homes and the alien
plotters left in grinning possession of the ground. Under the spell engendered by this
agitating apparition, and its patriotic call to a retributive but profitable war on the
malefactor's property, substantial departures were made from the principle of
trusteeship. 32
At the Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919, these and similar departures
from what had been regarded as customary international law33 were given
official sanction in the form of article 297 of the Treaty of Versailles, which
reserved to the Allied powers "the right to retain and liquidate all the property rights and interests belonging" to German nationals "in the territories
under Allied Control." 3" "The proceeds were to be devoted to the payment
of certain claims against Germany or German nationals. These claims arose
out of private debts, exceptional war measures undertaken by Germany, such
as sequestrations, and so-called neutrality claims which had arisen before the
various countries entered the war." 35 Any balance could be returned either to
the owners or to the Reparation Commission for general distribution, with
each Allied nation free to take advantage of the provision it chose. Some of
the European belligerents confiscated most of the property held under sequestration; others returned a good part of it. 3
Until the war, the exercise of authority in times of national emergency was
regarded as being in the discretion of the President. 37 President Lincoln had
invoked such discretion during the Civil War when, in 1861, he blockaded
Confederate ports, expanded the number of ships in the navy and enlarged
the military, prior to convening an emergency session of Congress.38 Once
' 2Quoted by Borchard in
"GATHINGS,

GATHINGS,

supra note 23 at ix.

supra note 23 at 47.

3'Quoted by Borchard in GATHINGS, supra note 23 at ix.
"Id.
"Id. The German government was supposed to, but because of inflation and other factors did
not, indemnify the private owners of expropriated property, except to the extent of about 10-12
percent.
"See H. R. REP. No. 459, supra note 22 at 1.
"STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON NATIONAL EMERGENCIES AND DELEGATED EMERGENCY
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Congress convened, it approved his actions "as if they had been issued and
done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of
the United States." 39 Lincoln maintained that his powers as Commander in
Chief and under the "take care" clause of the United States Constitution, 0
justified the extraordinary actions he took at the outset of the Civil War, and
the acts of Congress endorsing his actions made it difficult for the courts to
hold otherwise, at least, that is, until Ex parte Milligan." Even after that
decision, the Supreme Court endorsed President Cleveland's emergency intervention in a railroad strike in the celebrated In re Debs case, 42 and under
President Theodore Roosevelt's "stewardship" theory of the presidency
Lincoln's broad conception of presidential powers was generally extended.
President Wilson narrowed this conception, seeking congressional approval for most wartime actions.4 3 For six months after Congress declared
war against Germany in April 1917 (and notwithstanding the presence in
America of substantial amounts of private property belonging to resident
German aliens and to Germans living abroad), the property of alien enemies
was left unsequestered. A presidential proclamation4 4 enjoined all enemy
aliens "to preserve the peace towards the United States, .... to refrain from
crime against the public safety, and from violating the laws of the United
States and [its] Territories; ... to refrain from actual hostility or giving
information, aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States;. . .and to
comply strictly with the regulations [being] promulgated by the President." 4 ,
However, so long as they conducted themselves within the law, the proclamation said, enemy aliens "shall be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their
lives and occupations and be accorded the consideration due to all peaceful
and law-abiding persons," except as public (and the aliens' own) safety might
require.4
When six months later Congress enacted the Trading With the Enemy Act,
two official reasons were given: (1) to prevent aid or comfort to enemies or

POWERS, A BRIEF HISTORY OF EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
12 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as 1973 SENATE STAFF REPORT], cited in Note supra
note 22 at 516.
"Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 3, § 3, 12 Stat. 326. The same year Lincoln suspended the writ of
habeas corpus, and two years later Congress confirmed that "during the present rebellion the
President of the United States, whenever, in his judgment, the public safety may require it, is
authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus in any case .. "Act of Mar. 3,
1863, ch. 81, § I, 12 Stat. 755-58. This and other aspects of the prestatutory history of the
discretionary use by presidents of emergency powers is described in detail in C. ROSSITER, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE PRESIDENT, AND CRISIS GOVERNMENT (1948); and A. MILLER, PRESIDENTIAL
POWER IN A NUTSHELL (1977), especially at 169-175.

"ILe., U.S. CONST. art. 1I,
§§ 2 and 3, respectively.
'71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). See MILLER, supra note 39, at 173-74.
"158 U.S. 564 (1895).
"RossITER, supra note 39, at 229.
"Proclamation of April 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 1651, part 2.

"ld.

"61d.
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allies of enemies, and (2) to make available for war financing such funds in
this country as belonged to enemies or the allies of enemies.47 In most respects, the act followed closely the provisions of British practice.4 8 It provided for the immediate creation of the office of the Alien Property Custodian into whose hands all money and property were to be placed, subject to
the Custodian's responsibility to the President. The President was given
broad powers to carry out the act's provisions; to prohibit or regulate all
trading with enemies; and to appoint the Custodian and regulate his office
through Executive Orders.4 9
Section 5 of the act contained its most far-reaching emergency powers, by
giving the President authority to regulate and control United States currency.
It authorized him, inter alia, to place an embargo on gold, to regulate all
shipments of gold, to purchase silver, and to issue certificates on the metal he
had purchased. It also empowered him to investigate, regulate and prohibit
any transaction in foreign exchange, his control over this matter to be maintained by the system of granting licenses to all those engaged in such transactions. ' I The act was later amended to increase the President's power to control imports and exports of gold and silver and transactions in foreign trade
generally. 5
Most of the war-related statutes were terminated at the end of the war, but
the Trading With the Enemy Act was retained, primarily because property
was still held by the Alien Property Custodian under authority from the act.I 2
Although by its terms, section 5(b) had granted the President emergency
'
and
powers "compatable with. . . the successful prosecution of the war '"53
its language was limited to economic transactions with foreign countries, its
authority was later invoked by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in March
1933, as the legal basis upon which he declared a national banking holiday,
went off the international gold standard by placing an embargo on gold
shipments out of the United States, and licensed the banks to be reopened
after the banking holiday. 4 In fact, within eight hours after the Emergency
Banking Act was introduced in Congress, it was approved and signed into
law." To remove any doubts as to the President's authority under section

"Bulletin of Information Issued by theAlien PropertyCustodian 5 (1918), cited in GATHINGS,
supra note 23 at 65.
"GATHINGS, supra note 23 at 65.
49Id.

"Id. at 71.
'Act of April 22, 1918, ch. 62, 40 Stat. 535, and Act of Sept. 24, 1918, ch. 176, 40 Stat. 966.

See generally GATHINGS, supra note 23 at 71; and M.
WORLD WAR 11 (1943).

DOMKE, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY IN

"Note, supra note 22 at 518.
"Ch. 106, § 5(b), 40 Stat. 411 (1917). See generally 55 CONG. REC. 7013 (1917) (letter from
Sec'y of Treas. William G. McAdoo).
"GATHINGS, supra note 23 at 71.
"Note, supra note 22 at 518.
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5(b), Congress amended it to read, "During the time of war or during any
5
other period of national emergency declared by the President ....
In 1941 Congress again expanded the President's authority under the Trading With the Enemy Act by empowering him to define "any and all" of the
terms used in the statute. 7 The flexibility thus built into section 5(b)'s grant
of emergency powers became increasingly evident after World War II as
successive Presidents declared "national emergencies" to invoke them. President Truman, in 1950, declared a national emergency in connection with the
Korean War." President Johnson, in 1968, cited President Truman's declaration of national emergency as precedent for wide-ranging measures designed to correct the country's balance of payments deficit, 9 although, in
fact, this "emergency" had existed for some time prior to his taking action. 0
More recently, in 1970, President Nixon invoked section 5(b) as authority for
6
mobilizing National Guard units during a strike by Post Office employees. '
and, in 1971, invoked it again in order to implement a 10 percent import duty
6
surcharge. 1
The traditional acquiescence of Congress in assertions of national
emergencies by Presidents came to something of an abrupt end in the mid1970s, partly in a general reaction to what Congress regarded as a shift of
power from Congress to the President and partly in light of post-Watergate
demands for greater accountability from the President. The first reform
came in September 1976 with the passage of the National Emergencies Act
(NEA) '3 which was concerned, in the first instance, with the fact that the
Trading With the Enemy Act contained no criteria for determining the existence of a national emergency and no procedures for initiating or terminating

- Emergency Banking Relief Act of 1933, ch. 1, § 2, 48 Stat. I (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 95(a)
(1970) and 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1970). The House passed the bill after only 38 minutes of debate
and the Senate approved the legislation that evening. See 1973 SENATE STAFF REPORT at 7, cited
in Note, supra note 22, at 518n.
"Ch. 593, § 301(3), 55 Stat. 839 (1941) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 95a(3) (1976)).
"Pres. Proc. No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99 (1950).
"Exec. Order No. 11,387, Compilation, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1968).
"Note, supra note 22 at 519.
'Pres. Proc. No. 3972, 3 C.F.R. 35 (1970).
"Pres. Proc. No. 4074, 3 C.F.R. 80 (1971). President Nixon was scheduled to meet with
Emperor Hirohito of Japan within two weeks and, for that reason, did not want to cite the
Trading With the Enemy Act as authority for his declaration of a national emergency. Emergency Controls on InternationalEconomic Transactions:Hearingson Trading With the Enemy
Reform Legislation Before the Subcomm. on InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade of the
House Comm. on InternationalRelations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977), cited in Note, supra
note 22 at 519n. When the surcharge was challenged in court, however, the administration
specifically cited section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act. United States v. Yoshida Int'l,
Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1976). On appeal, the court found that "Itihe broad and flexible
construction given to § 5(b) by the courts which have considered it is consistent with the intent of
Congress and with the broad purposes of the Act." 526 F.2d at 583. For other recent instances in
which the act has been invoked as authority for executive branch action, see Note, supra note 22
at 520.
6350 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq., (1976).
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a national emergency once one had been declared. The NEA terminated any
previous declarations of national emergency, as of two years from the date of
its enactment." It also established procedures for declaring, conducting and
terminating future national emergencies, including a controversial "legislative veto" provision for the termination of a national emergency by Congress
by means of concurrent resolution.6 ' The NEA requires the President, once
he has declared a national emergency which he must do in order to exercise
any special or extraordinary powers given him by Congress," to indicate the
specific provisions of law under which he proposes to act in dealing with the
emergency. 67 His accountability and reporting requirements are also set
forth 8 and certain obsolete emergency power statutes are repealed.69
Procedural aspects of the declaration of a national emergency are taken
up, too, in the IEEPA, enacted in December 1977. Under this act, the President must declare a national emergency under the NEA and that emergency
must constitute an "unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in
whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security,
foreign policy, or economy of the United States ......
-0 The President is
obligated to "consult" with Congress, if possible, prior to declaring a national emergency,"' and to send a report to Congress immediately after exercising powers granted him by the IEEPA.7 2
Under section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, declarations of
national emergency provide a basis for future presidential actions, as well as
for the immediate emergency. That is, they are self-limiting neither in application nor time. 73 However, the powers granted by the IEEPA may be exercised only with respect to the specific "unusual and extraordinary threat" for
which a national emergency has been declared. A new threat requires a new
declaration of emergency."7 Thus, although President Carter was meticulous
in complying with the procedural conditions of the IEEPA in ordering the
freeze on Iranian government assets, a question arises whether that freeze
was justified in terms of the specific national emergency to which it re-

§ 1601.
"Id. § 1622(c). In signing the IEEPA, President Carter expressed serious concern over the
constitutionality of the legislative veto it contains. See 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1940
(Jan. 2, 1978).
6650 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (1976).
7
Id. § 1631.
8Id. § 1641.
691d. § 1651.
"050 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (1977).
"Id. § 1703(a).
"Id. § 1703(b). The House Report accompanying the IEEPA says that "[niothing in this
section should be construed as requiring submission of a report ... as a precondition of taking
action where circumstances require prompt action prior to or simultaneously with the submission of this report." H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 22 at 16.
"Note, supra note 22 at 524.
50 U.S.C. § 1701(b) (1977).
6"Id.
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sponded; that is, the possibility that Iran would suddenly transfer its funds
from American and other western banks to banks in friendlier countries.
Consideration of this question is taken up below.
The IEEPA authorizes the President to regulate transactions in foreign
exchange, banking transactions involving any interest of any foreign country
or a national thereof and the importing or exporting of currency or securities.
The IEEPA also authorizes the President to regulate or freeze any property in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.7" However,
unlike section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act (which remains in
effect to be used in time of a declared war), the IEEPA does not authorize the
President to vest title to foreign property frozen pursuant to it. In this respect, at least, it reestablishes the legal regime which generally prevailed
among nations prior to the first world war. How long this will be true is
uncertain, however, since last April President Carter, in somewhat ambiguous terms, expressed his intention to seek legislation permitting final judgments to be made against frozen Iranian assets and allowing title to vest in the
judgment creditors. 76 Legislation has also been introduced in the House of
Representatives which would allow the hostages and their families to recover
the amounts of their claims against Iran from assets of the Iranian government frozen by the President's order. 77
Current Treasury regulations authorized by the President in invoking the
IEEPA do not permit entry of judgments or decrees with respect to the frozen
assets nor do they allow payment or delivery from any blocked account.
These regulations" authorize only the filing of suits against the government
of Iran, not the entry or enforcement of judgments. They also authorize the
issuance of prejudgment attachments against Iranian assets, although, again,
not the payment or delivery of any blocked property to any court, marshal,
sheriff or similar official. Philadelphia attorney Gaylen J. Byker suggests in a
recent article79 that the regulations apparently give a plaintiff the right, in
effect, to secure a declaratory judgment adjudicating his claims against Iran
without giving him access to blocked assets; likewise, he notes, given the
existence of the President's freeze order, a prejudgment attachment appears

§ 1702.
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 611 (April 14, 1980).
'See, e.g., H.R. 7027, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H 2487 (1980). See also H.R.
6342, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980).
§§ 535.504 and 535.418 of the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,617
(1979), amended, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,650 (1979) and 44 Fed. Reg. 75,353 (1979), respectively (to be
codified in 31 C.F.R. Part 535).
"Byker, Do the Executive Freeze Order and Related TreasuryRegulations Override the Prejudgment Attachment Provisionsof the F. S.I.A. ? INT. PRACT. NOTEBOOK, No. 11, June 1980, at
5 (hereinafter cited as Byker). InternationalPractitioner'sNotebook is published by the American Branch of the International Law Association for its members and on a special subscription
basis.
Id.
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merely to give a plaintiff a right to have the goods seized and held if and when
the freeze is lifted, and establishes a priority in the attached property."
These regulations seem to conflict with provisions of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 197681 which specify in detail the law and procedure for
establishing federal and state jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign and for the
attachment of a foreign sovereign's property. This aspect of the Iranian assets litigation is itself complicated and is discussed separately below.
III. Why a Freeze?
The President froze assets of the Iranian government, choosing, at least for
the time being, to ignore those of Iranian nationals, although the IEEPA also
authorizes the freezing of privately owned property. I2 In his message to Congress explaining the circumstances which indicated the need for the powers he
was exercising, 3 the President cited "recent events in Iran and the recent
actions of the government of Iran,"'" adding that "these events and actions
put at a grave risk the personal safety of United States citizens and the lawful
claims of United States citizens and entities against the government of
Iran."' 5 The freeze, he said, was necessary to "enable the United States to
assure that these resources will be available to satisfy lawful claims of citizens
and entities of the United States against the government of Iran.'",
This claim has sparked considerable debate in financial circles. The
Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve have said the freeze was invoked to protect United States banks, which stood to suffer substantial losses
had Iran moved its deposits out as it threatened and then defaulted on its
loans. 7 But within the banking community doubts exist as to the necessity of
the freeze in this respect, since under prevailing syndicated loan covenants to
Iran and other Third World countries, the banks, in the event of a default,
could offset Iranian assets on deposit. This assumes, of course, that there are
assets (deposits) available to offset, i.e., that Iran would not have withdrawn
its funds from those banks."
It has been suggested in some quarters that President Carter may have been
prevailed upon by Chase Manhattan Bank to impose the freeze on Iranian
assets held with United States banks, in the face of a threat to its solvency

"In its per curiam opinion remanding Electronic Data Systems Corporation Iran v. Social
Security Organization of the Government of Iran, 610 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1979), the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit instructed the district court to consider the effect of the
president's freeze order on the necessity for a prejudgment attachment order, implying that such
an attachment might be meaningless under the circumstances. See Byker, supra note 79 at 5.
8-28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(f) and 1602-1611 (1976).
8250 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(l)(A) (1976). But see id. § 1702(b)(1) and 1702(b)(2).
" Le., pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1703(b)(2) (1976).
"15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 2118 (Nov. 14, 1979).
531d.
"Id.

"See The Banks Squabble Over Iran'sAssets, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 3, 1979, at 110.
"Id.
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caused by Iran's alleged policy of refusing to deposit further accruals with
it." It is noted, in this context, that the President's freeze order came at the
time an interest payment was due on the $500 million loan by the Chase-led
syndicate." A recent article in InternationalCurrency Review says that "[i]t
is widely believed in legal circles that the new Iranian Government, which has
a good reputation for meeting its international financial obligations, had
fully intended to service the outstanding loans and continued to acknowledge
its financial obligations to foreign banks." 9 '
On a tour of Mideast oil states and Europe shortly after the freeze had been
imposed, Secretary Miller explained that the freeze was necessary to prevent
Iran from irresponsibly converting its American-held assets into other currencies and causing havoc in foreign exchange markets."2 He added that it
would also make cash available to repay lenders in case of default.
It indirectly triggered the default on the interest due on the $500 million
loan to the Chase-led syndicate. 93 That default brought into operation an
acceleration clause in the main loan agreement which provides that if one
interest installment is not paid then the entire loan must be repaid immediately, after a stipulated grace period." The activation of that clause, in
turn, implicated acceleration clauses contained in the agreements governing
other so-called "jumbo loans" to Iran. These cross-default clauses are written in such a way that they entitle the lead bank to declare a state of default if
the borrower is in default with respect to any installment on a foreign commercial payment or indebtedness and if the lead bank is directed to do so by
the other banks comprising the syndicate. 9 As a matter of general practice,
bank syndicates have been reluctant to invoke such cross-default clauses in
international loans because to do so would be to throw a substantial portion
of these loans into default, a circumstance which could imperil the banks'
own position under domestic banking regulations. 6
"Legal Repercussionsof the Freezing of IranianAssets andLoans, 12 INT'L CURRENCY REV.

25, 27 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Legal Repercussions... ). According to this interpretation,
Iranian leaders regarded Chase as the Shah's bank and suspected that it held large sums of money
which had been misappropriated by the Shah and his close associates and family. With Iranian
deposits no longer abundant, it has been alleged that the bank feared that the flow of funds could
not be replaced adequately from other sources. The alleged involvement of David Rockefeller,
Chairman of the Board of Chase, in facilitating the Shah's transfer to a New York hospital for
treatment, has also been mentioned as providing circumstantial evidence in corroboration of this
interpretation.
"Id. at 28.
"'Id.at 27. It appears that, as of mid-July 1980, euroloans extended by syndicates which were
not led by an American bank as agent, and in connection with which the interest and principal
was not payable in the United States, have continued to be serviced by Iran. Id. at 29. See also
Ball, supra note 7, at 62.
"Ball, supra note 7, at 61.
93"d.

"See Legal Repercussions .

supra note 89, at 28.

951d.

"It remains to be seen, and no doubt litigated, whose approval would be necessary to restore
or institute what legal status to defaulted eurodollar loans in the event the President's freeze
order is terminated.
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In any event, even if only the Chase-led $500 million loan has been declared
in default, it would appear that all of Iran's dollar deposits at foreign
branches of American banks have been immobilized, either by the
President's freeze order, the effect of the offsets taken by the foreign
branches of American banks, or the terms of broadly phrased attachments
taken in the United States on any Iranian assets in the possession or coming
into the possession of American banks.
Lawyers for the Iranian government, and in some cases for creditors seeking to upgrade the priority of their interest in immobilized Iranian deposits,
have initiated litigation in the United States and European banking capitals
challenging the legality of the President's freeze order, the Treasury Regulations implementing them, the offsets, and the attachments.
IV. The Freeze and the IMF Agreement
The freeze and implementing regulations are being challenged in Europe in
respect of their purported application to dollar deposits at European
branches of American banks. A useful starting point for understanding the
issues this raises is the constitutive treaty of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), known as the Articles of Agreement or, less formally, the Fund
Agreement.97 Article VIII section 2(a) of the Fund Agreement provides that
no member of the IMF shall impose restrictions on the making of payments
and transfers for current international transactions, unless the approval of
the Fund is obtained. While section 2(a) does not contain express authorization for the fund to waive the obligation this imposes on members, as the
constitutive treaties of some international organizations do, 9" such authorization seems implicit and the Fund has long inferred such authority for itself.
In 1952, in fact, its executive board, regarding itself as an unsuitable forum
for discussing restrictions imposed by members for reasons of security, established a special procedure for dealing with such restrictions which would
avoid the necessity for debate. 99 Members are expected to give as much notice
as possible to the Fund before imposing restrictions; when the circumstances
preclude advance notice, which was presumably the case here, the members
are required to give notice as promptly as they can-ordinarily not later than
thirty days after imposition of the restrictions. Unless within thirty days of

"60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, Dec. 27, 1945. The IMF was established after the end of
World War 11as a mechanism for stabilizing currency exchange rates and for providing additional resources for countries with balance of payments problems. The Fund Agreement contains a code of conduct for member states in international monetary matters, as well as constituting the charter of the institution designed to administer that code and to participate actively in
monetary stabilization. See F. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING:
DOCUMENTS, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 227 (1977).
11J. GOLD, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM:

SELECTED ESSAYS 354n. (1979) (hereinafter cited as GOLD).
"Id. at 362, citing Decision No. 144-(52/51), August 14, 1952. SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 94-95 (5th issue, 1971).
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receipt of that notice the Fund informs the member that it is not satisfied that
the restrictions are solely for the preservation of security, the member may
assume that the Fund has no objection to them.' 0
The United States government formally notified the IMF of the restrictions
imposed by the President on November 28th, fourteen days after the freeze
went into force.'"' Having received no objection from the IMF, the United
States 2government assumes its freeze of Iranian assets complies with section
0
2(a).1
Section 2(b) of article VIII bears directly on the question of United States
jurisdiction over foreign branches of American banks. It established a legal
basis for mutual enforcement of exchange control regulations imposed by
member states, provided that such regulations are consistent with the Fund
Agreement and involve the currency of the member state seeking enforcement.' 03
It functions indirectly, operating not on the regulations themselves but
rather on those private contracts which ordinarily would be most directly
affected by the regulations, i.e., "exchange contracts." Exchange contracts
violative of a member's exchange control regulations are rendered unenforceable within the jurisdiction of any other member. Thus, to the extent
that the President's freeze order and the subsequent Treasury Regulations
constitute exchange controls and as such are consistent with the Fund Agreement, then private "exchange contracts" in violation of such exchange controls will not be enforced by the courts of other member states.
Do the agreements governing bank deposits frozen by the President's order
constitute "exchange contracts?" Do the freeze order and resulting regulations constitute "exchange controls?" These questions almost certainly will
be addressed in France and Britain where litigation is pending regarding the
legal effect of the "exchange controls," and both countries belong to the
4
IMF."
The significance of section 2(b) is that, if applicable, it renders moot the
question of the IEEPA's jurisdiction over foreign branches of United States
banks. The freeze applies extraterritorially, at least within the jurisdiction of
1001d.
"'Notification took the form of a letter from the Treasury Department to the United States
Director on the IMF Executive Board.
"''Theoretically, at least, a question may exist whether the IMF may grant subsequent approval to an act requiring prior permission. See GOLD, supra note 98, at 374-75.
" The text reads as follows:
(b) Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are contrary to
the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with this
Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member. In addition, members
may, by mutual accord, cooperate in measures for the purpose of making the exchange control
regulations of either member more effective, provided that such measures and regulations are
consistent with this Agreement.
"°'Thislitigation is of special importance because of the amounts of the Iranian deposits in
branches of American banks in these countries. London branches of American banks reportedly
hold $3 billion of frozen deposits and French branches of American banks reportedly hold about
$500 million. SeeA FieldDayfor Lawyersfrom the Gulf to the Strand, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 8,
1979, at 95.
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IMF member states, not by virtue of an expansive theory of national jurisdiction but through the workings of a multilateral treaty. Assuming that this
consistency is unassailable'05 and that the courts in member countries take
notice of the reciprocal obligations the Fund Agreement imposes, 06 the key
question becomes whether Iranian deposits overseas represent "exchange
contracts" involving United States currency.
The President's freeze order affected all Iranian government property
within the possession or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.' °7 This was subsequently modified by regulation to exclude
deposits held abroad in currencies other than United States dollars.0' 8 Consequently, the only overseas deposits affected by the freeze are United States
dollar deposits owed by branches of United States banks to Iranian governmental entities.
Theoretically, a bank balance represents a contract of indebtedness, the
holder of the balance being the creditor and the bank the debtor. It is therefore arguable that by freezing these dollar deposits overseas, the United
States undertook to regulate "exchange contracts" involving its currency, in
which event England and France, as IMF members, cannot enforce the
creditor's rights under these contracts without thereby violating section 2(b)
of article VIII of the Fund Agreement.
However, English and American courts have given a narrow construction
to the term "exchange contract" as used in section 2(b).' 0 ' In Wilson,
Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Teruzzi, "I a decision whose reasoning has been
criticized,"' the Court of Appeal interpreted the term "exchange contract"
to mean contracts for the purchase and sale of currencies. The court's reasoning appears to ignore the effects of all contracts other than those for the
purchase and sale of currencies, even if enforcement of such contracts may
violate exchange control regulations that are consistent with the Fund Agreement. The effect, arguably, is to undermine the currency stabilization regime
which the Fund Agreement establishes for the mutual benefit of member
states." 2 One might contend that it is the currency of Iran, which is also an
IMF member state, rather than that of the United States which now needs
protection. However, since it is the United States whose exchange control

5

"' See note 102, supra.
'06Apparently, on at least one occasion a court in France failed to do so. See Achour v. Perrot
and Bouderghouma, reported in Journaldu droit international, 105 Annee (1978), at 99-106.
'°TExec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979).
0544

Fed. Reg. 66,833 (1979) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. 535.566). Conversions of blocked

dollar deposits into foreign currencies are not authorized.
'"'Gold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts, ser. XIV, 26 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF
PAPERS 588, 604 (Sept. 1979); and id., ser. X11, 24 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS at 193194 (1977).

'"[1976] 1 Q.B. 683, [19761 1 Q.B. 703 (C.A.).
'See especially Gold, The FundAgreement in the Courts, ser. XII, 24 INT'L MONETARY FUND
STAFF PAPERS 193 (March 1977).
'"SeeGold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts, ser. XIV, 26 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF
PAPERS 590 (Sept. 1979).
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regulations are being tested in the courts of other member states, that point
appears to be moot.
Should the courts of England, France and other nations in which actions
have been brought by Iran to release frozen deposits fail to apply the provisions of section 2(b), it seems unlikely that they will find that the IEEPA
applies within their territorial borders. Courts generally have not favored
discriminatory exchange controls imposed by one country against another." I
Ironically, one of the leading decisions to this effect is from New York's
Court of Appeals. In J. Zeevi & Sons Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda)
Ltd., I14 the material interests of the forum state were said to be implicated
because of the effect that withholding a remedy might have had on New York
as a financial center. The cases pending in London and Paris are not apt to
overlook the New York court's ruling, should the issue of the extraterritoriality of the TEEPA arise. Both cities function as important recycling centers for
petrodollars.
V. The Setoffs
Linked to the legal status of the billions of dollars of Iranian government
accounts frozen in foreign branches of United States banks is the issue of the
status of the setoffs taken by United States banks against funds thus frozen.
Although there are provisions in many of the loan agreements with syndicates
headed by American banks for resolving claims thereunder within the United
States,"' foreign courts have already become involved in resolution of the
questions raised by the setoffs because of attachments made by U.S. banks
seeking to cover their proportionate share of loants in default or in jeopardy.
This means that not only Iran's interests, but also those of attachment creditors, are at stake in litigation challenging the legality of the setoffs.
Perhaps the first question that arises is why United States banks have attached Iranian assets in Europe when the Treasury regulations implementing
the President's freeze order authorize setoffs by them against frozen overseas
Iranian dollar deposits.' 6 The reason appears to be that the $2.6 billion in
eurodollar loans to Iran by United States banks and the $3.5 billion in Iranian
deposits with United States banks in Europe are unevenly distributed among
the banks. It seems likely that some United States banks had insufficient
Iranian deposits to debit once Iran defaulted on their share of the syndicated
loans. Morgan Guaranty, for example, managed to attach Iran's 25 percent
interest in Krupp Fried, the parent holding company of the German-based
Krupp group, reportedly worth about $435 million."' Morgan Guaranty's
"1d. at 598. See also Gold, supra note 111,
at 221-23.
'37 N.Y.2d 220, 333 N.E.2d 168, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1975).
"'Legal repercussions ..., supra note 89, at 29.
"'Le., 44 Fed. Reg. 65,988 (1979) (to be codified as 31 C.F.R. 535.902).
"'A Banking Rift Over Iran's Assets, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 10, 1979, at 30.
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loans to Iran are estimated to be on the order of $150 million; if so, one might
guess that Morgan Guaranty sought the order of attachment in order to cover
the difference between the $150 million potential loss due to default and the
amount of Iranian deposits frozen in its accounts." 8
As noted earlier, Iran, in challenging the setoffs, is arguing that the
declaration(s) of default are (were) not justified. There is, after all, a circular
logic in the relationship between the President's freeze order and the default
by Iran on loans from the syndicate (or, if that proves to be the case, the
syndicates) headed by a United States bank. The President sought to protect
claims of United States citizens and entities, but claims of the banks for
possible default were already protected by clauses within the loan agreements; assuming, once again, that Iran would not have withdrawn its funds,
despite its stated intention to do so). Of course, the hostages, their families
and other Americans damaged by the actions which preceded the President's
imposition of the freeze are entitled to compensation for their losses. But the
$6 billion of Iranian assets frozen in the United States appears to provide
ample security for that. Iran argues that the banks used the freeze as an
excuse to call the loans.
It would have been possible, under the Treasury Regulations implementing
the freeze, for Iran to continue servicing its debts to United States banks and
United States bank-led syndicates. So long as payment of these obligations
was made from nonblocked accounts (any foreign currency deposits or dollar
deposits in non-United States banks), those payments would not appear to be
blocked.' 'I Any bank receiving such interest payments could freely circulate
the funds (except to an Iranian entity).' 20 However, such payments have
become politically impracticable since November 19, 1979, when the Chaseled syndicate declared Iran to be in default on the $500 million loan.
To support its case against the default declaration, and to attempt to maintain its commercial relations with United States banks or suppliers, Iran
might have continued to "draw checks" against the blocked funds. It has

"'The loss is only "potential" because Iran has not been declared in default on all its loans to
United States banks. For example, although Morgan Guaranty's $25 million share of the $310
million credit to Iran's National Petrochemical Company has not been paid its portion of principal or interest since November 14, 1979, the syndicate of thirty-four banks which made the loan
has not voted to declare default, perhaps because the nine banks in the group which are American were outvoted by some or all of the seventeen which are not. See A Banking Rift .. ,supra
note 118, at 30. Presumably, if the freeze is lifted, the members of the syndicate, including
Morgan Guaranty, would be paid by Iran. In the other Chase-led syndicated loan (i.e., the $500
million one), this does not appear to be possible, since the loan has already been declared in
default and Iran's accounts have been debited.
"'See 44 Fed. Reg. 66,591 (1079) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. 535.904.) A statement to the
contrary appearing recently in the influential InternationalCurrencyReview, supra note 89, at
29, appears to be in error.
"'See 44 Fed. Reg. 67,617 (1979) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. 535.415).
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even been suggested that the mere bouncing of such checks would convey to
Iran's creditors its desire to pay its debts, while at the same time showing that,
but for the freeze order, it would have done so.' 2 ' This amounts to a defense
of force majeure, an attractive claim for Iran's lawyers to make. However,
force majeure is a double-edged sword: if the courts regard the President's
freeze as justified by the events in Iran which preceded it, then presumably
the debiting banks will be regarded as having been justified in protecting their
claims. Iran will be seen to have brought the force majeure upon itself.' 22
In any event, the question of the validity of the setoffs taken by American
banks on Iranian deposits in their European branches may turn on the courts'
determination of whose law applies. The New York banks are taking the
position that New York law applies, pointing to what they say is the customary industry practice with regard to such eurodollar loans. A similar conflicts
question is likely to arise in litigation over the legal effect on deposits held in
their branches abroad of broadly worded attachments taken on the Iranian
deposits in American banks in the United States. This issue, which will assume critical importance in the event the setoffs are declared invalid, may
turn upon a determination of whether the deposits in foreign branches are
constructively within the United States. The possibility of conflicting decisions among European and American courts cannot be discounted.' 23
VI. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
One of the stated purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (FSIA)' 24 was to end the practice of using attachments to initiate suit
against foreign governments in state and federal courts and to substitute
therefore comprehensive service procedures contained in the FSIA itself.' 25
Thus, it permits prejudgment attachment only when "the foreign state has
explicitly waived its immunity from attachment prior to judgment. . ." and
then only for the purpose of securing satisfaction of a judgment, not to
obtain jurisdiction. 26
However, the FSIA also provides that this ban is "subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of the
enactment of this Act. .. ,'2" Because the FSIA is applicable in many of the

'ILegal repercussions.... supra note 89, at 30. On November 23, 1979, Iran's Minister of
Economics and Finance, Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, reportedly said that Iran would not repay
international loans arranged under the Shah's regime. This assertion was later contradicted by
Ali Reza Nobari, Governor of Bank Markazi, Iran's central bank, who said Iran would meet all
"legitimate" obligations. See Wall St. J.,Dec. 3, 1979, at 2, 10.
"'Legalrepercussions .... supra note 89, at 30.
"'Fora discussion of other legal issues involved in the setoffs, see Nathan, The IranianLoans
Question: Can Those Set-Offs Be Justified, EURODOLLAR, January 1980 at 33.
U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq (1976).
"'Id. § 1608.
"21Id.§ 1610. See generally Geveke and Co. Int'l, Inc. v. Kompania Di Awa I Elektrisidat Di
Korsou, N.V., 482 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
"20 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976).
1'228
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Iranian asset cases initiated in this country, the courts have had to determine
in such cases whether the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
Consular Rights between the United States and Iran (1955 Treaty) 28' is one
such international agreement. The results to date have been mixed. 2 9
Article XI, paragraph 4 of the 1955 Treaty provides:
No enterprise of either High Contracting Party ... which is publicly owned or
controlled shall, if it engages in commercial, industrial, shipping, or other business
activities within the territories of the other High Contracting Party, claim or enjoy,
either for itself or for its property, immunity therein from taxation, suit, execution
of judgment or other liability to which privately owned and controlled enterprises
are subject therein.' 130
In Behring International, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force,' 3' a federal
district court in New Jersey ruled that the words "or other liability" did not
represent the explicit waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment required by the FSIA.' 32 It went on to decide, however, that the treaty language
implicity waived immunity from such attachment and that because the 1955
Treaty is an agreement to which the United States was a party when the FSIA
was enacted, this implicit waiver controlled for the purposes of the FSIA's
treaty exception provision.
In Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Company,"" a federal
district court in New York, in dictum, disagreed with the decision in Behring,
reasoning that even though the 1955 Treaty could, theoretically, authorize
prejudgment attachments in light of the FSIA's treaty exception, it did not, in
fact, do so because prejudgment attachment cannot be waived by mere irriplication.
In Electronic Data Systems Corporation, Iran v. The Social Security Organization of the Government of Iran, ", the district court ruled that the 1955
Treaty did constitute an explicit waiver for the purposes of the FSIA and it
entered a prejudgment attachment order directing the marshal to seize certain
funds in a New York bank. In the interlocutory appeal from this ruling, the
United States filed a brief amicus curiae in which it argued from State Department documents and on public policy grounds that the 1955 Treaty applies
only to "the property of publicly owned or controlled commercial or business
enterprises of the Contracting States" and not to "the property of the Contracting States as such or their non-commercial agencies and instrumentali-

"'Entered into force June 16, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. 3853.
"'See Byker, Note on PrejudgmentAttachment Under the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act
of 1976, INT'L PEAc. NOTEBOOK, No. 9, Jan. 1980, at 5, from which the summary herein contained of litigation to date on the prejudgment attachment implications of the 1955 Treaty is
drawn.
"'See note 128 supra at art. XI, 1 4.
"'.475 F. Supp. 383-395 (D.N.J. 1979).
"'Le., 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d) (1976).
"'478 F. Supp. 724, 728-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
'Electronic Data Systems Corporation, Iran v. The Social Security Organization of the
Government of Iran, 610 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1979).
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ties."' 35 On November 28, 1979 the Second Circuit remanded the case so that
the district court could (1) ascertain the position of the State Department
concerning the defendants' right of access to U.S. courts "under the circumstances now prevailing"; (2) consider the effect of the President's freeze
order upon the necessity for its order of attachment;' 3 6 and (3) review its
interpretation of the 1955 Treaty in light of the government's amicus brief.' 11
As noted earlier with reference to the more recent of Gaylen Byker's two
recent articles on this subject,' 38 the potential for conflict exists between the
FSIA, on the one hand, and the freeze order and attendant Treasury Regulations, on the other. It can be argued, he writes, that the regulations merely
provide that the freeze order does not prevent normal litigation from going
forward; in other words, that they merely authorize judicial proceedings,
including prejudgment attachments, if those proceedings are otherwise in
accordance with governing law and rules of procedure. If this is the proper
interpretation of the regulations, he says, there is no conflict between them
and the FSIA. Support for this position seems to be inferrable from the
government's amicus brief in ElectronicData Systems, and from the Justice
Department's post-freeze reaffirmation of its position that the government
of Iran and its noncommercial agencies or instrumentalities- were immune
from prejudgment attachment.' 39
However, plaintiffs in the dozens of Iranian attachment cases which have
been consolidated for argument on common issues of law before Judge Kevin
T. Duffy in the District Court for the Southern District of New York have
argued that even if the FSIA would ordinarily prohibit prejudgment attachments of Iranian government property, the freeze order and regulations
promulgated under it permit the court to enter a prejudgment attachment
order attacking Iranian government property. The argument, Mr. Byker
says, 0 while not fully articulated in the briefs filed with Judge Duffy, seems
to be that the president had the authority under the IEEPA to "nullify, void,
prevent or prohibit

. . . any

right, power, or privilege with respect to

. .

.any

property in which any foreign country or any national thereof has an interest,"'"' and that by exercising that power he could eliminate the right of

" Quoted in Byker, supra note 129, at 5.
F.2d 94, 95 (2d Cir. 1979).
11'610 F.2d 94, 95 (2d Cir. 1979). The federal district court in Texas, where the underlying suit
in the ElectronicData case is being tried, issued a preliminary injunction restraining the defendant from transferring funds in a bank account, to ensure that funds would be available to
satisfy any judgment plaintiff might recover. Defendant argued that such an injunction was
tantamount to a prejudgment attachment from which it is immune under the FSIA. The court,
without explanation, stated that its action was not tantamount to a prejudgment attachment and
that the FSIA was irrelevant. No. CA3-79-218-F (W.D.Tx., June 21, 1979), cited in Byker, supra
note 129, at 5.
" See note 79 supra.
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1i3d.

"iOld.
"50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B).
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privilege of governments to enjoy immunity from prejudgment attachment. ' 2 Under this analysis, the FSIA and the subsequently enacted IEEPA
have equal status as legislation, with the more recently enacted IEEPA controlling in case of conflict. Alternatively, one might argue that the more
recent statute authorized the President to take away the right of a particular
government, here Iran, to enjoy the protection against prejudgment attachment of its property otherwise afforded by the FSIA."
Byker suggests three possible lines of argument which could be advanced to
counter the contention that the freeze order overrides the FSIA, that is, to
argue that the FSIA provisions on prejudgment attachment remain in effect
and control judicial proceedings involving Iranian government property.
One can argue:
1. that the President's declaration of an emergency and issuance of a
freeze order were ultra vires either because they were based on an unconstitutional delegation of power or because they exceeded the power
delegated;
2. the blocking of Iranian assets is within the power properly delegated to
the President, but the authorization of prejudgment attachments contrary to the FSIA was not within those powers; or
3. that the Treasury Regulations authorizing prejudgment attachments
contrary to the FSIA go beyond properly delegated powers and/or go
beyond the scope of the freeze order itself.""
However, he notes that the argument that the freeze order itself was ultra
vires and thus unconstitutional seems unlikely to prevail in light of the generous scope given to the President's power to declare a national emergency and
impose asset freezes in precedent cases."'
The second argument-that the blocking of assets is within the power delegated to the President by the IEEPA but his overriding the FSIA provisions
on prejudgment attachment is not-has considerably more weight, says
Byker:
The IEEPA does not expressly delegate to the President the power to grant the

courts jurisdiction or to provide judicial remedies, and the purpose of the act can be
accomplished without prejudgment attachments contrary to the FSIA. The FSIA,
which was intended to deal comprehensively with all aspects of sovereign immunity,

contains numerous exceptions to sovereign immunity, including various kinds of
waivers. There is no exception, however, for any determination of emergency and/
or freeze order issued by the President, despite the fact that such determinations
and orders were well known to the drafters of the FSIA. It is elementary law that
when Congressional legislation is the basis for an executive order, Congressional
statutes take precedence over the executive order if there is a clash between them.4
"432Byker, supra note 79, at 5.
1 1d.
1I4d.

"'See, e.g., Propper v.Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949); Sardino v. Fed. Reserve Bank of New
York, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966).
'"Byker, supra note 79, at 6, citing Marks v. Central Intelligence Agency, 590 F.2d 997 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); ANTIEU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 529 (1969).
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Thus, he concludes, it can be argued that since regulations authorizing
prejudgment attachments, regardless of existing laws and rules, are not expressly authorized by the IEEPA, such regulations are void, if they are interpreted to permit prejudgment attachments contrary to provisions of the
47
FSIA.'
The argument that if the Treasury Regulations seek to override the FSIA
they exceed the power delegated by Congress in the IEEPA is merely another
way of making the preceding argument that the freeze order, if intended to
override the FSIA, is beyond the power delegated. 4' 8 However, there appears
to be more precedent for overturning regulations promulgated by executive
4 9
departments than for overturning an executive order.'
VII. Related Issues:
Justiciability and Standing to Sue
The relevance of the FSIA to the Iranian assets litigation is by no means
limited to the issues thus adduced. In the American Internationalcase, for
example, Judge Hart ruled that, quite aside from the waiver of sovereign
immunity which he, too, had found to exist in the 1955 Treaty, the Iranian
government agency defendant in the case, the Central Insurance of Iran (Bimeh Markazi Iran) (CII), and its property were subject to the court's jurisdiction because CII is a commercial entity of the sort to which the 1955 treaty
and FSIA deny immunity.'II In support of this interpretation of the commercial exception written into the FSIA, '' Judge Hart cited the ElectronicData
Systems decision, '2 and a pre-FSIA case'I 3 invoking a restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity. That case, one should note, may or may not have survived the enactment of the FSIA. Judge Hart went on to note that under the
FSIA's commercial exception provision'"4 defendants do not enjoy immunity
in the United States in cases in which the action is based "upon an act outside
the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States.""' In other words, the CII and its property do not enjoy immunity

"'Byker, supra note 79, at 6.
143Id.
."See, e.g., United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873 n.12 (1977), citing Manhattan Gen.
Equip. Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129 (1936).
"'CII"was created in 1971 for the purposes of (a) carrying on the commercial enterprise and
business of issuing reinsurance, underwriting large and specialized risks and the like, and (b)
overseeing and superintending the insurance industry in Iran." American Int'l Group, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. No. 79-3298 (D.D.C. July 10, 1980) (order granting partial summary judgment), at 2.
"Judge Hart here was referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1976).
"'See note 80, supra.
"3Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank of New York, 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973).
1"28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
'"Id.
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under the FSIA not just because the CII is a commercial agency or instrumentality of a foreign government, as defined in the FSIA, but rather because it is
such a foreign government agency or instrumentality and the action in the
case is based upon a commercial act (here, the nationalization of plaintiffs'
interests) abroad which caused a direct effect in this country.' 6 Judge Hart
did not address the question of whether only commercial property can be
attached; this would affect, for example, American International's attachment of Iranian art.
Not all of the cases brought so far in U.S. courts against the Republic of
Iran and its governmental agencies are apt to meet the test thus imposed.
Moreover, for reasons I have addressed previously in Trends, "' the codification of a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity (that is, one embodying an
exception for commercial activities) does not resolve all questions about the
justiciability of suits against, or involving the interests of, foreign sovereigns.
One stumbling block is the so-called political question doctrine, pursuant to
which courts have ruled non-justiciable, issues-and thereby sometimes entire cases-which they have regarded as serious encroachments on the foreign
relations prerogatives of the political branches of government.' 8 In the two
cases which gave this doctrine strength in the early 1960s,' 59 the Supreme
Court cautioned that it was error to suppose that every case or controversy
which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. But the
Court, in one of the cases,' 60 developed a six part test for finding the existence
of a "political question" which, if construed literally, would disqualify a
great many of the issues and cases occasioned by the Iranian revolution,
especially those which turn upon alleged violations of customary international law. Moreover, such deference to the political branches of government, especially the executive branch, during periods of international crises
are not altogether uncommon occurrences in American judicial history, even
without specific doctrinal justification.
Predictably,' 6 ' the Justice Department has been asking the courts to defer
ruling on the Iranian assets disputes before them on the grounds that any

I'For an earlier discussion of this point, see Gordon, Trends, INT'L LAW. 167, 169-170 (1979).
Judge Hart found that defendants' failure to make provision of compensation to plaintiffs at the
time of the taking of their property has had a "direct effect" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a) (2). American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, supra note 150, at 8. And he
found that the failure of defendants to provide compensation to plaintiffs, resulting in an increase of the Iranian state insurance monopoly from 25 or 50 percent to 100 percent is an act "in
connection with a commercial activity," within the meaning of that section. Id., citing United
Euram Corp. v. U.S.S.R., 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
"'See Gordon, Trends, 13 INT'L LAW. 725 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Trends 725]; and Gordon, Trends: American Courts, International Law and "Political Questions" which Touch
Foreign Relations, 14 INT'L LAW. 297 (1980) [hereinafter cited as American Courts].
'I discuss this at length in American Courts, supra note 157.
"'Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964).
"'0Baker v. Carr, supra note 159.
"'See American Courts, supra note 157 at 136.
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action taken by the courts could have serious repercussions in the conduct of
62
foreign policy and could complicate efforts to resolve the crisis in Iran.1
The question of the justiciability of issues raised by the Iranian assets litigation in light of the political question doctrine has been the question of their
justiciability in light of the act of state doctrine. In his ruling in the American
Internationalcase, Judge Hart rejected defendants' argument that the act of
state of doctrine precluded him from awarding summary judgment. He gave
three reasons. First, he said, the theory underlying the doctrine was inapplicable in the litigation before him. "The court is not asked to judge the validity
of defendants' expropriation of plaintiffs' interests in Iran, but rather defendants' failure, in violation of the [1955] Treaty and international law, to
make adequate provision for the determination and payment of prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation."' 6 3 "[T]he Act of State Doctrine,"
he went on, distinguishing the facts before him from those which produced a
contrary result in Bank Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,'" "does not preclude judicial review where, as [in the instant case], there is a relevant, unambiguous treaty setting forth agreed principles of international law applicable
to the situation at hand." 6' Third, Judge Hart said, the doctrine is inapplicable "since defendants' failure to compensate plaintiffs occurred in connection with a commercial activity of defendants."' 66
Judge Hart's interpretation of the act of state doctrine is not apt to be the
final word on the subject during the course of the Iranian assets litigation,
regardless of whether his ruling is successfully appealed, regardless, in fact,
of the applicability of the 1955 Treaty's compensation provision to the facts
at issue in the other cases. Varying interpretations and applications of the
doctrine have been heading for a showdown in the federal courts for the past
few years, the impasse on the Supreme Court over its scope notwithstanding. 1

67

'62The relationship between the two doctrines is discussed in Trends 725 supra note 156, and
American Courts supra note 157.
' 6 3Civ. No. 79-3298, at 6.
6376 U.S. 398 (1964).
'6 3Civ. No. 79-3298, at 6. Article IV, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty, supra note 128, provides:
Property of nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party, including interests
in property, shall receive the most constant protection and security within the territories of the
other High Contracting Party, in no case less than that required by international law. Such
property shall not be taken except for a public purpose, nor shall it be taken without the
prompt payment of just compensation. Such compensation shall be in an effectively realizable
form and shall represent the full equivalent of the property taken; and adequate provision
shall have been made at or prior to the time of taking for the determination and payment
thereof.
'-Civ. No. 79-3298, at 6, citing Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682 (1976). In Dunhill, a plurality of the Court, or some of them, said that the act of state
doctrine admits of an exception with respect to the commercial activities of foreign states. Prior
to Judge Hart's ruling, only the Second Circuit appears to have found that exception an established precedent. See Trends 725 supra note 156, at 727.
7
' See generally American Courts supra note 157.
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VIII. The Vesting Problem
That billions of dollars of Iranian government assets have been attached in
the United States does not guarantee that the claimants who have attached
them will be able to apply these assets, or the proceeds of their sale, in satisfaction of their claims. As noted earlier, the Treasury Regulations implementing the President's freeze order do not permit final judgments to be
taken against any of the assets blocked by the order. The result is to render
problematical the legal effect of the attachments which the regulations do
authorize. I
The Treasury Regulations could not authorize vesting of title in the frozen
assets in any case, since, unlike the Trading With the Enemy Act with respect
to foreign assets frozen during a war, the IEEPA does not authorize the
vesting of title to foreign assets frozen during a national emergency declared
pursuant to the NEA.
Section 207 of the IEEPA' 6' does permit the President, at the termination
of a national emergency under the NEA, to continue to block any foreign
assets that were frozen as of the date of termination, if he determines that the
continuation of the freeze is necessary because of American claims against
the foreign nation in question.' 7 The effect, however, is merely to postpone
resolution of the basic problem of what to do with the frozen assets. This
country's Hamiltonian tradition notwithstanding, there is strong pressure
building to confiscate the Iranian assets in order to assure satisfaction of the
claims of claimants and creditors. The proposed legislation referred to earlier' 7' which would vest title to frozen Iranian government assets in satisfaction of the claims against Iran by the hostages and their families is evidence of
this pressure, as was President Carter's
announcement in April 1980 that he
7
would introduce similar legislation.' 1
As of the date of the submission of this installment of Trends for publication, 73 the President had not yet submitted such legislation and one suspects
he will be discouraged from doing so by those executive branch officials
responsible for planning the negotiating position the government will take in
seeking a resolution of the crisis in Iranian-American relations. One can
assume that they are not eager to reduce the options available to them in their
negotiations, something which confiscating or earmarking specific Iranian
assets for specific categories of claimants would undoubtedly do.

"'See 44 Fed. Reg. 67,617 (1979)(to be codified in 31 C.F.R. 525.504 (a-c); 44 Fed. Reg.
69,650 (1979) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. 535.504(d); 44 Fed. Reg. 75,353 (1979)(to be codified
in 31 C.F.R. 535.418).
'50 U.S.C. § 1706 (a)(1) (1977).
"Congress is authorized to specify in a concurrent resolution terminating the emergency that
the assets may not continue to be blocked. Id. § 1706(b).
"'Note 77, supra.
'Note 76, supra.
"'July 25, 1980.
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The importance of this point should not be minimized. However long it is
deferred, whether months, years or even decades, the resolution of those
problems which have led to the interruption in relations between the tivo
countries will have to be addressed by them. When it is, the national interests
at stake will not be limited to the claims of nationals of one state against the
government of the other or, for that matter, the monetary claims of the two
governments against each other (and against each other's nationals). 7 In
fact, it is not unforeseeable that in their pursuit of an overall settlement which
will protect each country's vital strategic interests, negotiators for both sides
will come to see the question of monetary claims as one of far less importance
than the private claimants now see it. The possibility that such a settlement
would undervalue the aggregate amount of the claims of United States nationals against Iran is one reason why some claimants seem eager to establish
the merit and amount of their claims at an early date, hoping that, as is said to
have been the case with the Czechoslovakian claims program, the publication
of an aggregate claims figure will force the executive branch to negotiate a
better settlement than it would do otherwise.
This same wish has led to suggestions that the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission (FCSC) or some new body with similar mandate be authorized
to "preadjudicate" claims of American nationals against Iran, much as the
FCSC has done in the past with respect to claims of American nationals
against foreign governments growing out of World War II and the Chinese
and Cuban nationalizations of 1949 and 1960, respectively. However, in
some cases, the government's flexibility in asserting an overall claims amount
has been effectively negated by the figure of total claims previously
"awarded" (which in the first instance means evaluated), and of course publicly announced, by the FCSC. Theoretically, the United States is not estopped from asserting in behalf of its nationals a higher claims figure than
that found to be reasonable by its own claims commission, applying congressionally established standards of proof, damage and norms of compensation.
Practically, though, such an assertion would be hard to justify. Given that
most post-war lump sum settlements of international monetary claims have
amounted to a fraction of the amounts asserted, having an FCSC fix a maximum figure in advance may actually work to place a low ceiling on any
settlement possibility."'

I"Iran is said to owe the United States some $435 million, consisting mostly in credits granted
through the Export-Import Bank. In addition, private Iranian corporations are said to owe the
United States government $39 million. See 125 CONG. REC. S. 18,366 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1979)(remarks of Sen. Byrd). The U.S. government is said to have some $400 million of Iranian government funds on deposit, these having been intended for the use of the U.S. Department of Defense
in providing military equipment to Iran. Id. Whether the United States may set off the Eximbank
credits by vesting title to the funds on deposit is uncertain. At the moment, the funds appear to be
in legal limbo, frozen but not yet subject to debit for set-off.
" Elsewhere I have suggested other reasons for doubting the wisdom of the process represented by the FCSC. See INT'L PRAC. NOTEBOOK, No. 6, April 1979, at 4-5. A leading

Washington attorney has taken issue with the reasons I have given.

INT'L PRAC. NOTEBOOK

No.
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In any event, it seems likely that Congress will be urged to establish a
domestic claims evaluation procedure. The suggestion is not without merit,
aside from its likely impact upon the government's negotiating position, because such preadjudication preserves at an early date, when memories and
records are still fresh and as available as they are ever likely to be, the precise
facts upon which individual claims and the damages asserted in them are
based. Historically, the establishment of mixed claim commissions or other
transnational procedures for evaluating international monetary claims has
usually taken decades to bring about. Early presentation and evaluation,
however flawed, are thus not without their adjudicatory advantages.
Pressure on Congress to establish an Iranian claims evaluation procedure
may be accompanied by pressure to persuade the executive branch to void all
lawsuits involving frozen Iranian government assets.' 76 Again, one must
wonder whether such action, like the vesting of frozen assets would enhance
the prospects for improved relations with Iran or, rather, deal those prospects a severe blow. Similarly, the virtues of these and similar initiatives
undertaken in the interests of the claimants, or groups of them, must be
measured in terms of their probable effect on the eurodollar market, already
shaken by the events of November 1979; the recycling of petrodollars, the
success of which will continue for the foreseeable future to shape the pattern
of economic growth throughout the world; the balance of political allegiances in the Middle East and Europe; and the influence which the United
States government and private institutions are able to maintain over people
and events critical to the stability and prosperity of the nations outside the
control of the Soviet Union.
Should relations between the United States and Iran show a sudden improvement, it could be possible at an early date for claimants to resolve their
claims against Iran directly with Iran-an outcome one should hope for but
not take for granted. Even if it should happen on the most favorable of terms
and quickly, it would be difficult, given the number of claimants, for Iran to
process the claims against it speedily or easily. One would be more realistic to
expect that, while some more normal relationship between the United States
and Iran is certain to come about sooner or later, the bitterness engendered by
recent events may make it politically inexpedient for future Iranian governments to volunteer domestic procedures for evaluating claims by American
nationals against it.
A mixed claims commission might be more acceptable to both governments. But such commissions take time to establish and they have not always
been blessed with the quiet anonymity and freedom from political influences

10, April 1980, at 12 (letter from Brice M. Claggett). But I still feel compelled to doubt that the

FCSC has the expertise necessary to adequately deal with the complicated issues, claims and
counterclaims which the Iranian situation involves.
"I.e., pursuant to section 203(a) of the IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(l)(B). But see Borden,
Iranian Claims Settlement PresentsNovel Problems, LEGAL TIMES OF WASHINGTON, Feb. 28,
1980, at 10, where the possibility that such avoidance may be unconstitutional is mentioned.
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essential to their proper functioning. Such, in fact, was part of the reason for
the development of the practice of lump sum settlements, distributed according to awards made by national claims commissions.
Another possibility, so obvious it is easy to overlook, would be to use an
existing facility, such as the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (or, in applicable cases, its new "special facility"), the International Chamber of Commerce's arbitration facility, or even
a chamber of a revitalized Permanent Court of Arbitration.I7 7 However, a
review of the advantages which these and other possible arrangements offer is
beyond the scope of this installment of Trends.
Concluding Observations

Judge Hart's ruling in the American Internationalcase has attracted attention, in part, because of the unambiguity of his conclusions, especially his
conclusion, apparently unique in recent American jurisprudence, that an
American court can decide the amount of damages a foreign country owes an
American national in respect of property or property interests of that national which it has nationalized. However, an appeal from Judge Hart's
ruling has been filed. Moreover, the decisions in these and similar appeals are
apt to be taken to the Supreme Court, or to result in remands and rearguments and new rulings which are themselves appealed. So much is at stake in
the Iranian assets cases that it is highly unlikely that procedural or substantive
stones will be left unturned. The ultimate disposition of the issues discussed
in this installment of Trends is thus not imminent.
Moreover, it is likely to be affected by the rulings of European courts, as
well as by executive actions over which neither the European nor the American courts have control. Consequently, it seems unwise to assume that the
issues which now loom so large in the Iranian assets litigation will remain so
throughout the course of the litigation. That may be worth keeping in mind as
one mulls over the issues described herein.

"'For a number of reasons, including the nature of the expertise and trial experience such a
claims procedure would require of the panel evaluating the claims, the International Court of
Justice, as presently constituted, seems less well suited to this task than the other institutions I
have mentioned.

